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Abstract 
In the 18th century, Benjamin Franklin said that "Nothing is certain but death and taxes". The 
21st-century adaptation of this famous expression could be "nothing is certain but longevity and 
taxes." Longevity risk is a critical risk for institutions that provide life-long payments such as 
pension funds, annuity providers and public pension schemes. The amount of unfunded 
liabilities institutions face will be massive if their beneficiaries live considerably longer than 
expected. This paper addresses the problem of longevity risk and discusses the ways in which 
individuals, life assurers, annuity providers and pension plans can manage their exposure to this 
risk. We discuss whether the traditional insurance mechanism, involving risk transfer and 
pooling, can deal appropriately with longevity risk. We then review longevity risk management 
solutions, comprising both traditional insurance and reinsurance techniques and recently 
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1. Introduction 
Increasing life expectancy at all ages in the developed world 
is one of the success stories of the last century. 
Improvements in survival are pushing new limits: today 
more than half of all males and two thirds of all females 
born in Western countries may reach their 80th birthday. 
The proportion of centenarians increased about ten times 
over the last thirty years, as more and more people 
celebrate their 100th birthday (Robine and Vaupel, 2001). 
These mortality improvements are a clear evidence of how 
far society and science have come in improving general 
living conditions, promoting healthier lifestyles, and offering 
better medical and healthcare services that have helped to 
prolong our lives. As a result, the demographic structure of 
the population in developed countries has changed 
significantly, mostly because an increasing proportion to 
the overall improvement in mortality is due to a faster than 
expected reduction in mortality rates at advanced ages. 
Developments in the treatment of heart diseases, or greater 
awareness of the dangers of smoking are just some of the 
reasons behind this trend that has resulted in a rapidly 
increasing number of centenarians in the industrialized 
world (Vaupel, 2010). 
Although the evolution of mortality improvement is a slow 
but persistent process, which is influenced by 
socioeconomic, biological, environmental, and behavioural 
developments, past trends suggest that further changes in 
mortality levels are to be expected.  But the truth is that 
future life expectancy improvements are uncertain and 
difficult to predict. "Nothing is certain but death and taxes," 
Benjamin Franklin once said. That was in the 18th century. 
The 21st-century adaptation might be "nothing is certain 
but longevity and taxes." 
One of the most challenging tasks in longevity risk 
modelling is the issue of systematic longevity risk and of 
rare but extreme longevity events.  These events are those 
cases where individuals live far longer than expected. 
Predicting how long humans can live is a difficult task that 
requires high quality mortality data, complex statistical and 
mathematical models, and information on the dynamics of 
biological factors and causes of death. 
Longevity implies that individuals increasingly face the risk 
of outliving the savings that they have accumulated during 
their working lives and, therefore, that they seek to insure 
this risk through public PAYGO social security systems, 
occupational pension plans, private life insurance and 
annuity products, or reverse mortgages. These various 
forms of annuities are in reality insurance against individual 
longevity risk, because these products pool the risk of living 
longer than expected, and therefore needing more 
resources in retirement, among the annuitants or pension-
scheme members.  
For actuaries within the insurance and pension fund 
industries, it has always been crucial to have access to a 
reliable model of mortality that can be used to compute 
prices and reserves and to manage risk, particularly in 
products such as annuities whose payments are contingent 
on survival. Therefore, assumptions about the survival 
probabilities given the actual age of the annuitants or 
pensioners, the interest rate used to discount expected 
contingent benefit payments, and the cost structure of the 
insurance company are critical when pricing these 
contracts. 
Life tables that incorporate a forecast of future mortality 
trends are the most popular instrument used to represent 
the underlying distribution of the duration of future 
lifetimes, and the accuracy of these tables depends on the 
reliability of the mortality data. In traditional contracts, the 
insurer -governments, pension fund sponsors, insurance 
companies, or annuity providers- bears the risk that the 
mortality projections may turn out to be incorrect, and that 
the policyholders end up living longer than expected. 
Measuring and managing longevity risk is a big challenge 
for the risk managers of annuity providers and of public 
and private pension plans. The total amount of global 
pension-related longevity risk exposure in private-sector 
corporations has been estimated at $25 trillion1.  
Insurance companies used to be able to offset any adverse 
developments in longevity risk with the returns of profitable 
investments. This, however, has become increasingly 
difficult, because the global trend towards deregulation and 
liberalization of insurance markets has led to fiercer 
competition and diminishing profit margins, and because 
investment profits have almost vanished in a historically low 
interest rate environment. As a result, sound assessment 
and pricing of longevity risks has become absolutely 
crucial. 
At the individual level, providers can diversify longevity risk 
using pooling mechanisms that follow the law of large 
numbers2, assuming insured lives are homogeneous and 
independent. In aggregate terms, longevity risk is the risk 
that people of a certain population might live longer than 
expected on average. The risk of systematic deviations is 
different in nature from that of random fluctuations around 
the trend.  This risk is well-known in the insurance business, 
since it breaks down risk-pooling mechanisms, it becomes 
non-diversifiable, and it makes the provision of risk 
management tools increasingly difficult. 
For public pension systems, the challenges of growing life 
expectancy and aggregate longevity risk are both financial 
and political.  As a consequence of demographic, social, 
and economic changes, most OECD countries have 
1 The Life and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA). 
2 In statistics and probability theory, the law of large numbers is a theorem 
that states, in simple terms, that the average of the results obtained from a 
large number of trials of a random event (e.g., death) should be close to its 
predicted expected value, and will tend to become closer to this value as 





                                                                
          
           
 
changed their pension systems since 1990 to ensure long-
term affordability. The different ways in which future 
pensions will be affected by changes in life expectancy and 
the issue of how to share the burden of such adjustments 
between today‘s taxpayers, contributors, and retirees and 
future taxpayers, contributors, and retirees is a critical but 
less debated question.  
In many countries, pension reforms have been parametric, 
and they have preserved the overall structure and 
philosophy of the public, earnings-related schemes. Recent 
measures include adjustments in either the benefit level or 
the qualifying conditions to reflect changes in life 
expectancy (e.g., Portugal or Finland), adjustments in the 
benefit levels according to the numbers of pensioners per 
contributor (e.g., the German sustainability factor), delays 
of the standard retirement ages, increases in the number of 
contribution years needed to qualify for full benefits (e.g., 
Denmark, France, Portugal), adjustments in the 
contribution levels (e.g., Canada), or changes in the 
valorisation of pension entitlements.  
In many other countries, pension reforms have been 
systemic since they have changed the way in which future 
benefits will be determined. For instance, Italy, Poland, 
Sweden and Latvia have replaced defined-benefit, earnings-
related public pensions with notional-accounts schemes.  
These schemes are pay-as-you-go schemes but the notional 
accounts that mimic some of the features of funded 
defined-contribution schemes. At retirement, the notional 
capital accumulated in these accounts is transformed into 
an annuity, but at a rate set by the government, which is 
generally determined to reflect changes in life expectancy 
over time automatically. 
Forecasting how long people will live has large public policy 
and public health implications, since it is very possible that 
life may be extended curing deadly diseases such as 
cancer, heart disease, and diabetes, but without curing 
other debilitating but non-fatal conditions, such as arthritis, 
Alzheimer’s, and vision and hearing loss.  This may lead to 
an older population that will be larger, but less healthy, and 
more dependent.  
Although systematic longevity risk is traditionally viewed as 
non-insurable, a new market for mortality-linked derivative 
securities has been developing since the turn of the 
century. Alternative risk transfer (ART) mechanisms such as 
longevity-linked securities (see e.g., Blake, 2006; Cummins, 
2006; Cummins and Weiss, 2009) offer a natural capital 
market solution to the longevity risk problem since there is 
insufficient capital in the insurance and reinsurance industry 
to absorb the total exposure to this risk. The real challenge 
for public pension systems and for private insurance 
companies consists precisely in the design of products that 
can absorb any adverse events related to future mortality. 
In other words, the true challenge is how to deal with the 
longevity risk. 
Payment of retirement pensions is usually an integral part 
of funded pension schemes. The basic forms of retirement 
payout options available to allocate the savings for 
retirement include lump sums, programmed or phased 
withdrawals, annuities, and hybrid solutions that can 
involve any combination of these options (see Bravo and 
Holzmann, 2014). Life annuities have obvious attractions 
from the point of view of the pensioner, since the 
payments continue for as long as she lives, and this 
reduces the risk of outliving one’s financial resources 
substantially. In other words, life-annuities offer unique 
insurance features against individual or family longevity risk. 
However, despite the apparent attractions of life-annuities, 
they are usually not very popular with the investing public 
due to various demand and supply constraints.  
The main problem for the insurers is to make the annuities 
market attractive to the insured. Indeed, the risk borne out 
by insurers for life-annuities, which is most probably too 
high, is reflected in the high premiums charged for these 
products.  These premiums can be so high that they 
discourage the individuals who intend to purchase the 
annuities. 
In this paper we analyse the insurability of longevity risk 
and we discuss briefly the traditional insurance schemes 
and the innovative capital-market-based risk transfer 
solutions. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 
we briefly review the mortality trends observed in most 
OECD countries and we illustrate the consequent need for 
appropriate longevity-risk measurement. To improve our 
understanding of the precise nature of longevity risk, in 
Section 4 we briefly review the concept of risk and some 
basic insurance principles. The goal is to clarify whether 
longevity risk can be classified as an insurable risk, in 
general terms. In Section 5 we describe the main tools 
available to manage longevity risk, which comprise both 
traditional insurance and reinsurance techniques and 
recently developed capital market instruments. In Section 6 





          
           
 
2. What drives the demand for longevity risk 
protection? 
The demand for longevity risk protection has been increasing 
in the last years.  This is a consequence of an aging 
population, of the increase in life expectancy at old ages, and 
of the shift in the responsibility for providing sufficient 
retirement income from governments and enterprises to 
individuals.  This shift has resulted from the substantial 
underfunding of many defined benefit schemes, and from an 
increase in the disclosure and regulatory obligations of funded 
pensions schemes.  These two trends are expected to increase 
the recognition liabilities and of funding needs. 
The increase in the percentage of people that are approaching 
or entering retirement is a significant driver of the growing 
need to address longevity risk. In western countries, a fraction 
of the ageing of the population is largely attributed to the so-
called baby boomers, the large cohorts born in the fifties and 
sixties after the end of World War II.  
At the same time, a growing proportion of the population that 
reaches retirement age is also living longer than before. 
Improved hygiene and living standards, unparalleled medical 
progress, better and healthier lifestyles, and the absence of 
global military conflicts and of major pandemic crises are the 
main reasons why individuals around the world are enjoying 
rising longevity. In the last six decades, we have been 
observing a decline in mortality rates in western countries at all 
ages. To illustrate this trend, Figure 1 shows the so-called 
mortality profiles at ages 0-95 from 1950 to 2010 in Portugal, 
and Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of mortality rates by age 
during that same period.  
 
Figure 1: Crude mortality rates by year, Portugal 1950-







Figure 2: Crude mortality rates by age, Portugal 1950-
2010, ages 0-100, both sexes 
 
Mortality rates were calculated using data provided by 
Statistics Portugal. We can observe a downward trend in 
mortality rates at all ages, with rates of improvement being 
higher at young ages. In Spain, in Portugal and in many other 
developed countries, mortality experience over the last 
decades shows some patterns that affect the shape of curves 
that represent mortality as a function of the attained age. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the moving mortality scenario 
referring to the Portuguese overall population, in terms of 
survival functions (survival probability as a function of the 
attained age x) and curves of deaths (number d_x of the 
people who dye as a function of age x, expressed as a 
proportion of those initially alive, l_0). Survival functions and 
curves of deaths relate to various cross-sectional mortality 
experiences. 




          
           
 
The results from experienced trends in mortality are self-
evident. In particular we want to highlight the following 
aspects: (I) an increase in the life-expectancy, both at birth and 
at old ages for both sexes (II) an overall increase in the most 
probable age of death, as shown by the mode of the curve of 
deaths. 
Turning back to the shape of the survival function and the 
curve of deaths, the following aspects of mortality must be 
pointed out in Portugal, in Spain, and in most developed 
countries: 
a) we observe an increasing concentration of deaths around 
the mode (at old ages) of the curve of deaths.  As a 
consequence, the survival function moves towards a 
rectangular shape, a phenomena called "rectangularization" 
in the actuarial/demographic arena; 
b) owing to this rectangularization phenomena, the mode of 
the curve of deaths tends to coincide with the highest 
attained age of the population, and this age is moving 
towards very old ages; in the scientific literature related to 
this subject, this trend is called "expansion" of the survival 
function (see Figure 4); 
c) more recently, we observe higher levels and a larger 
dispersion of accidental deaths at young ages (the so-called 
young mortality hump), particularly in the male population. 
 
Figure 4: Curve of deaths, Portugal, total population, 
selected years 
At another level, in recent years we have observed a shift in 
responsibility for bearing longevity risk. The role of funded 
individual retirement provisions has increased over recent 
decades. Among the reasons that explain this trend we include 
the following (see Holzmann, 2014): (i) Systemic reforms of 
public pension schemes and the move from collective, 
unfunded, and defined-benefit (NDB) schemes towards 
individualized, funded, and defined-contribution (FDC) 
schemes; (ii) the decreasing generosity of public annuities as 
the result of fiscally driven public pension reforms across the 
globe and the encouragement by governments for voluntary 
supplementary saving to cover the old-age income gap; and 
(iii) the fact that many existing funded defined-benefit schemes 
have been replaced by funded defined-contribution schemes. 
In recent years, the number of employees covered by defined-
benefit pension plans has been shrinking steadily. The move 
away from defined-benefit plans and into defined-contribution 
plans has shifted the responsibility of ensuring a sufficient 
retirement income stream from employers to individuals. 
Moreover, benefits expected from public pension systems are 
increasingly uncertain due to their unsustainable nature. As a 
result, individuals’ exposure to political, investment, and 
longevity risks has increased. 
Facing increasing pension fund liabilities and funding deficits, 
many private pension plans are increasingly looking towards 
solutions to reduce their pension obligations and transfer risks. 
If future funding needs are clearly on an upward trajectory, the 
persistent low interest rate environment will force private 
pension plans to cover fund deficits. Additionally, stricter 
disclosure and funding rules set by regulators (e.g., Solvency 
II) are expected to increase liability recognition, funding needs 
and capital requirements.  The recognition of longevity risk, 
and any resulting increase in pension liabilities as companies 
incorporate new information on longevity (e.g., new life tables) 
exposes listed companies to potential negative valuation 
assessments. This will encourage insurers to reduce their 








          
           
 
3. Is longevity an insurable risk? 
Longevity risk is the risk that future outcomes in mortality and 
life expectancy will turn out to be systematically different from 
expectations. Longevity risk expresses itself as either an 
idiosyncratic risk, unique to each individual, or as an aggregate 
risk that is due to the uncertainty about overall mortality rates 
of the entire population. Individuals, life insurance companies, 
annuity providers, corporate pension funds and governments 
are all carriers of longevity risk. 
An individual self-managing her retirement income through 
withdrawals from defined contribution plans, individual 
retirement accounts or other personal savings faces the risk of 
outliving her assets – individual longevity risk – as she may be 
depleting her wealth at too high a rate.  
For institutions that make payments contingent on how long 
individuals live, such as life insurance companies, annuity 
providers, private pension plan sponsors and governments 
through their social security pension systems, aggregate 
longevity risk refers to the risk that mortality assumptions are 
not accurate and retirees live longer than expected, on 
average. In a historically low, and almost zero, interest rate 
environment, aggregate longevity risk has become one of the 
most significant sources of risk faced by financial institutions, 
with the potential to affect adversely both their willingness and 
ability to supply retired households with financial products to 
manage wealth in the payout phase. 
A well-functioning annuity market will become increasingly 
important as Governments cut social security pensions, 
companies move away from defined-benefit plans and as 
defined-contribution plans mature. Among the many demand 
and supply constraints that still hamper the development of 
annuity markets, the inability of annuity providers to hedge the 
aggregate longevity risk they face is one of the most 
significant. Aggregate longevity risk already conditions the 
price and the availability of annuity products in defined-
contribution schemes, and will affect insurance company 
solvency should the Solvency II proposals be finally adopted. 
In fact, the new regulatory regime will require insurance 
companies operating in the European Union to hold significant 
additional capital3 to back their annuity liabilities unless 
longevity risk can be hedged effectively or marked to market. 
There is insufficient capital in the insurance and reinsurance 
industry to deal with total global private-sector longevity risk. 
The extra capital that will be required as a result of this new 
regulatory regime will have to be passed on to customers, at 
some point in time, decreasing the money’s worth of their 
annuities. 
The question, therefore, is how to manage both idiosyncratic 
and aggregate longevity risk.   Those challenged by uncertain 
longevity risk have been searching for solutions to mitigate, 
3 This is the so-called market value margin (MVM) that reflects the cost of capital 
to cover ‘non-hedgeable’ risks. 
 
transfer or share this risk among a larger group of participants. 
Longevity risk management solutions comprise both traditional 
insurance and reinsurance techniques and recently developed 
capital market instruments. 
Another question that emerges is whether or not longevity risk 
is, in general terms, an insurable risk. In other words, the 
question is whether the traditional insurance mechanisms, that 
involve risk transfer and pooling, can deal appropriately with 
longevity risk. 
As we will see from the discussion below, the answer to this 
question is somewhat mixed. In fact, on one hand, as long as 
certain prerequisites are fulfilled, idiosyncratic longevity risk 
can be diversified by traditional pooling or insurance 
mechanisms. However, on the other hand, aggregate 
longevity risk cannot be eliminated or diversified and, 
therefore, it can only be managed using appropriate loss-
control and loss-financing techniques. 
 
3.1 A Reminder of some Risk 
and Insurance Principles 
To better understand the precise nature of longevity risk and 
to elaborate on its insurability properties, we briefly review the 
concept of risk and some basic insurance principles. In the 
insurance area, the concept of risk refers to the uncertainty 
concerning the occurrence of a loss or of events that might 
produce a loss (for example, an event is death of a 
policyholder). Losses must be measured in financial terms and 
can be analyzed according to their likelihood (probability or 
chance), the immediacy of the causes of the losses (peril, e.g., 
death, fire, theft), the frequency of their occurrence, and the 
severity of the financial losses incurred when the event occurs. 
In its broadest context, the term risk includes all situations in 
which there is an exposure to adversity. Risks may be 
classified in many ways: (I) static and dynamic, (II) fundamental 
and particular, (III) pure and speculative, and (IV) specific and 
systematic. However, only certain distinctions are particularly 
important for our purposes. 
The distinction between pure and speculative risks is an 
important one because, normally, only pure risks are 
insurable. Speculative risk refers to speculative risk events in 
which there is a possibility of loss but also a possibility of gain 
or a possibility of neither loss nor gain. Gambling is a good 
example of a speculative risk. In a gambling situation, risk is 
deliberately created in the hope of gain. The student betting 
€20 on the outcome of Saturday’s football game faces the 
possibility of a loss, but this is accompanied by the possibility 
of a gain. Random events cause the possible outcomes to 
occur. The term pure risk (sometimes called hazard risk or 
accidental risk), on the contrary, is used to designate those 




                                                                
          
           
 
loss, that is, in which there are only two possible outcomes. 
One of the best examples of pure risk is the possibility of loss 
surrounding the ownership of property. The person who buys 
an automobile, for example, immediately faces the possibility 
that something may happen to damage or destroy the 
automobile. The only possible outcomes are loss or no loss.  
Typically, only pure risks are insurable and the reason is very 
simple. Insurance is not concerned with the protection of 
individuals against the losses that result from speculative risks.  
Instead, it is concerned with the protection against losses that 
result from random adverse events. Speculative risk is 
voluntarily accepted because of its bidirectional nature, which 
includes the chance of gain. 
Not all pure risks are insurable, which means that a further 
distinction between insurable and uninsurable pure risks must 
be made. Personal, property and liability risk are pure risks. 
Personal risks consist of the possibility of loss of income or 
assets as a result of the loss of the ability to earn income. In 
general, earning power is subject to four perils: (a) premature 
death, (b) dependent old age, (c) sickness or disability, and (d) 
unemployment. Mortality and longevity risks can be 
considered personal risks. 
How does insurance work? Insurance involves the transference 
and pooling of risk. Risk is transferred from the insured to the 
insurer, i.e., the insurer assumes the financial responsibility for 
the loss and agrees to indemnify the insured in the event of a 
covered loss. The indemnification can be partial or total, in the 
form of cash, repair or replacement of an asset, or provision of 
services, and it can benefit first or third parties. 
The insurer dilutes the risk transfer using pooling mechanisms. 
What does this actually mean? Insurers issue policies to a large 
group of homogeneous people who want to insure against a 
particular loss, and they collect their premiums into what is 
called the insurance bucket, or pool. Because the number of 
insured individuals is normally large, insurance companies can 
use statistical analysis and principles, such as the law of large 
numbers, to project what their actual losses will for a given 
group of people and types of risk.  
They know that not every insured individual will suffer losses at 
the same time, that some will not suffer them at all, and they 
also know that that are exposed to estimation risk (model, 
parameter, basis risks). For instance, when companies issue life 
insurance they know that within their own portfolio some 
policyholders will die before their expected life-times are over, 
some will die after that date. This is part of the deal. Companies 
can always improve the accuracy of their predictions of future 
losses and manage the estimation risk properly. This is what 
allows them to operate profitably and at the same time to pay 
for the claims when and if they arise4. Policyholders pay for the 
probability of the loss and for the protection that they will 
receive for any losses that might occur. 
Consider, for instance, the case of life-annuity contracts, an 
instrument that is well suited to insure against individual 
longevity risk. An annuity is a contract that promises to make 
4 For instance, most people have auto and home insurance but only a few 
actually get into an accident or have their property damaged. 
a regular series of payments over a person’s lifetime in 
exchange for a lump-sum premium or for a sequence of 
premiums. When an insurance company issues or sells a life 
annuity to someone, the company must try to predict when 
she will die, and payments will cease, so that it can determine 
the appropriate annual or monthly payments. It seems 
reasonable to think that the longer an annuitant is forecast to 
live (i.e., the longer her life expectancy), the lower the 
payments must be. Otherwise, the company will be almost 
surely end up losing money. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore interest and the time 
value of money. If the annuitant is forecast to die in exactly 20 
years, then a €100,000 annuity premium must be returned to 
the annuitant in 240 monthly payments, each of which of 
approximately €417 (100,000/240). If, instead, the annuitant is 
forecast to die in exactly 25 years from now, then the monthly 
payment must naturally be lower, in this particular example 
approximately €333 (100,000/300). So, apart from interest and 
the time value of money considerations, pricing annuities is for 
the most part about predicting how long the annuitants will live.  
How does an insurance company make these predictions? What 
happens if it is wrong about the expected longevity and the 
annuitant does not die exactly when she was supposed to? The 
answer to the first question is that because the insurance 
company is selling life annuities to many different people, it does 
not have to predict exactly how long a particular annuitant will 
live but, rather, how long an individual member of a large group 
of people will live on average. And, as you can imagine, 
forecasting the life expectancy of a group is much easier than 
forecasting the exact length of life of any individual.  And the 
forecast becomes easier with the size of the population.  
What makes this principle of offsetting risks work in a precise 
manner is the law of large numbers. If the insurance company 
pools a large enough number of annuitants with similar 
forecasted life expectancies -year-by-year survival probabilities 
to be more precise- the risk-offsetting process can take place 
with much more accuracy than what would be possible for a 
pool of just a small number of individuals. By selling thousands 
of life annuities to a homogeneous group with the same age, 
the law of large numbers guarantees that, on average, even 
though not in any individual case (except by a quirk of fate), 
they will really live to their life expectancy. Therefore, 
insurance companies are only concerned by the behaviour of 
the average of their pool. 
Technically speaking, the tool life insurance companies use to 
make inference about the probability of someone surviving 
any particular year of age or to estimate their remaining life 
expectancy is called a life-table, and it is also called a mortality 
table or an actuarial table. Insurance contracts trade 
uncertainty for certainty. Without insurance an individual is 
uncertain about the individual frequency and severity of her 
losses (e.g., the precise time of death).  
By buying insurance, an individual trades a potentially large 
and unpredictable loss for the relatively small and predictable 
loss that she incurs when she pays the premium. Premiums 
can be viewed as small losses with probability equal to 1, that 




                                                                
          
           
 
3.2 Are there Ideal 
Requirements for a Risk to be 
Insurable? 
From the discussion in the previous section, we could be 
tempted to conclude that for a specific risk (e.g., longevity) to 
be insurable the only thing that is required is to pool a large 
number of individual risks. The fact is that this might not be 
enough and that not all risks are insurable by the private 
sector. Although, ideally, there are various requirements that 
risks should meet in order to be insurable, in practice these 
requirements are rearely fulfilled and the insurer has to decide 
whether to address the problem through some contractual 
solution or, simply, not to insure that particular risk. 
Risks that can be insured by private companies typically share 
the following features: 
 
1. Risk pools must contain a large number of 
homogeneous exposure units 
Since insurance operates through pooling resources, the 
larger the pool the more accurate the predictions will be. 
This allows insurers to take advantage of the law of large 
numbers in which actual losses and predicted losses are 
similar. However, insuring a large group of individuals is 
not enough, the group should also be homogeneous, that 
is, the individuals should have similar characteristics with 
respect to expected losses or, otherwise, the pooling 
mechanism will not work correctly. Insurance companies 
spend a lot of effort and money in underwriting and 
classifying risks in order to produce homogeneous risk 
pools and to price contracts appropriately, that is to charge 
higher premiums for higher risk. Risk-based or actuarial 
pricing tools are used for this purpose. If the underwriting 
fails, insurance companies face an adverse selection (anti-
selection, or negative selection) problem. 
 
2. Loss should be fortuitous 
The event that constitutes the trigger of a claim should be 
fortuitous, accidental, or unintentional, or, at least, it 
should be outside the control of the beneficiary of the 
insurance. The loss should be "pure" in the sense that it 
results from an event for which there is only the 
opportunity for cost. If the event is not accidental, a 
problem of moral hazard might arise, that is, the existence 
of insurance changes the behaviour of the insured who 
acts to increase the frequency or the severity of the losses. 
Events that contain speculative elements, such as ordinary 
business risks, are generally considered uninsurable. 
 
3. Loss should be definite and measurable (time, place, 
and amount) 
For a risk to be insurable, there must be certifiable 
evidence to establish "proof of loss," not just casual 
references. This means that the loss must have taken place 
at a known time, in a known place, and from a known 
cause. Loss should be definite in order to be easy to verify 
that a loss has in fact occurred. It should be measurable in 
order to measure or determine the amount of the loss.  A 
very simple example is the death of an insured person who 
has taken a life-insurance policy.  Ideally, the time, place 
and cause of a loss should be clear enough that a 
reasonable person, with sufficient information, could 
objectively verify all three elements. 
 
4. Insuring loss must be economically feasible 
The size of the loss must be meaningful from the 
perspective of the insured. Insurance premiums need to 
cover both the expected cost of losses, plus the cost of 
issuing and administering the policy, adjusting losses, and 
supplying the capital needed to reasonably assure that the 
insurer will be able to pay claims. For small losses these 
costs may be several times the size of the expected cost of 
the losses. There is little interest in paying such costs 
unless the protection offered has real value to the insured. 
 
5. Premium should be affordable 
If the likelihood of an insured event is so high, or the cost of the 
event is so large that the resulting premium is large relative to 
the amount of protection that the policy offers, it is unlikely that 
anyone will buy insurance, even when it is available. 
 
6. The loss should be predictable 
To calculate losses and premiums, there are two elements 
that must be at least estimated, if not formally calculated: the 
probability of frequency of the loss and its severity. Other 
elements of pricing include expenses and investment income.  
 
7. There is no catastrophic loss possibility to the insurer 
All individual losses are off course personal catastrophes. 
The reference here is to national or area disasters, such as 
floods, riots, wars, earthquakes, etc. The insurer's cost of 
these disastrous events must be within the insurer's ability 
to pay the claims. Insurers very often limit their exposure 
to a loss from a single event to some small portion of their 
capital base or try to manage it through financial 
diversification or reinsurance. 
In principle, mortality and longevity risks accomplish most of 
the requirements to be insurable by private companies. By 
implementing proper underwriting and risk evaluation and 
classification, insurers can build up homogeneous risk pools, 
and address potential adverse selection problems resulting 
from information asymmetries. Mortality events are, normally, 
unintentional, losses that result from death are for the most 
time definite and measurable, longevity protection has real 
value to the annuitant, because they eliminate the risk of 
outliving one's assets and, premiums are in general affordable 
in competitive insurance markets. For long term contracts like 
annuities, the critical point comes from the predictable nature 
of the risk.  This is because it is difficult to predict how long the 
members of a pool will live with sufficient accuracy and 
because systematic deviations from the expected duration of 
their lifetimes may occur. 
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3.3 Diversifiable and non-
diversifiable longevity risk 
In Figures 5(A), 5(B) and 5(C) we represent the projected 
mortality rates at a given age x (the solid blue line) and three 
sets of possible future mortality experience (the black dots). 
Deviations from the projected mortality rates in Figure 5(A) can 
be explained in terms of random fluctuations of observed 
mortality rates around the corresponding projected mortality 
rates. Random fluctuations are a recognized component of risk 
in the insurance business often named process risk. In simple 
terms, random variation risk is the risk that individual mortality 
rates differ from the outcome expected as a result of chance, 
some people will die before their life expectancy and some will 
die after. In risk theory, there is one fundamental result which 
states that the severity of process risk decreases in relative 
terms as the pool size increases. Life insurance companies 
deal with this random variation of risk by pooling and relaying 





Figure 5: Experienced mortality vs. random fluctuations and 
systematic deviations 
 
The experienced profile depicted in Figure 5(B) cannot be 
accredited to random fluctuations only, since we can clearly 
observe random fluctuations around and random deviations 
from expected values. This pattern can be explained as the 
result of an actual mortality trend being different from the 
trend that was forecasted and, as a consequence, systematic 
deviations arise. 
The risk of systematic deviations can be attributed either to 
model risk or to parameter risk. This means that the either the 
model used to project mortality or the relevant parameters 
that identify that model do not represent actual mortality 
trends. Trend risk is, in some sense, like inflation risk, an 
aggregate risk that cannot be diversified away by pooling or 
diversification mechanisms.  Moreover, the bigger the number 
of individuals in an insure pool, the larger the relative impact of 
trend risk.  
The law of large number does not apply in the case of trend 
risk. In trend risk, all the insured people or annuitants will 
deviate in the same direction and the realizations will not get 
closer to expected values as the size of the pool increases. 
When individuals live systematically longer than expected, 
insurers face with aggregate longevity - or mortality - risk. 
Private insurers that pay lifetime benefits are unable to hedge 
this risk effectively without suitable hedging instruments.  
The experienced mortality profile depicted in Figure 5(C) most 
likely represents the consequence of a catastrophic risk, 
namely the risk of a sudden and short-term rise in the 
mortality frequency, as a result, for instance, of an epidemic or 
a natural disaster. Catastrophic mortality risk is also, by 
definition, a non-diversifiable risk. Process risk, model and 
parameter risk, and catastrophic risk constitute the four 
mortality risk components. 
Finally, empirical studies in some countries suggest that 
generations born in certain years, or cohorts, are experiencing 
a specific improvement in their mortality risk. Under these 
























          
           
 
4. How to manage longevity risk  
Insurers provide most of the products that help individuals to 
manage the risk of outliving their assets. Individuals can insure 
their lifetime income by purchasing annuities in the pay-out 
phase of their defined contribution plans and personal 
retirement accounts. They can also voluntarily purchase a 
single premium immediate annuity (or a deferred annuity) 
through other lump-sum savings.  
For insurers, longevity risk management solutions currently in 
place include both loss control and loss financing techniques. 
Loss control techniques are for the most part performed via 
product design, that is, via an appropriate choice of the 
various items that constitute an insurance product (for 
example, risks covered, maturity, price). Loss control 
techniques include both loss prevention and loss reduction 
strategies. Loss prevention comprises risk management 
techniques whose purpose is to reduce the frequency of 
losses, and loss reduction tools attempt to reduce the severity 
of those losses. 
In managing individual and aggregate longevity risk, the 
pricing of insurance products provides a tool for loss 
prevention. If we consider, for instance, a life annuity product, 
expected longevity improvements recommend the use of a 
projected or prospective life table to price the annuities. 
Additionally, because of uncertainty in future mortality trends   
-which constitutes a non-diversifiable risk- a safety loading is 
typically added onto the prices, increasing the premiums paid 
by the policyholders. If life insurers have conducted their 
underwriting and risk classification operations properly, 
specifying different contingency loading for various categories 
of risk may also be a solution to enforce pooling effects and to 
reduce systematic risks. 
Pursuing loss reduction requires controlling the amounts of 
benefits paid. With traditional level annuity contracts this is not 
possible since the product guarantees the same amount of 
benefit for the duration of the insurer’s lifetime, and regardless 
of its length. Hence, to pursue loss reduction some flexibility 
must be added to the annuity product. One solution could be 
to reduce the annuity benefit in the occurrence of an 
unforeseen mortality improvement, for instance, by 
developing longevity-linked annuity contracts. This would 
share the longevity risk between annuity providers and 
annuitants and could contribute to reduce the premiums paid 
by the policyholders and the capital requirements demanded 
to back the annuity promises made by the insurers. However, 
in this case the resulting product would be a non-guaranteed 
annuity, something that may be difficult to sell to customers. A 
potential alternative solution could be to reduce the level of 
investment profit participation if adverse mortality is 
experienced in a with-profit annuity contract.  
Loss financing techniques include hedging, transfer and 
retention solutions. Risk transfer can be realized via traditional 
reinsurance arrangements, longevity swaps (swap-like 
reinsurance), Alternative Risk Transfers (ART) that involve 
securitization (e.g. longevity bonds, mortality bonds), pension 
buy-in and pension buy-out operations and Q-forwards. Risk 
transfer can also be realized through longevity-linked annuities, 
which are annuity contracts that adjust their benefits if 
observed mortality improvements differ sizably from expected 
mortality paths. 
Hedging strategies in general consist in assuming a risk that 
offsets another risk borne by the insurer involving, for 
instance, various portfolios or lines of business within the 
company. In particular, a natural hedging of longevity risk 
consists in underwriting both life insurance and life annuities 
for similar groups of policyholders. 
 
4.1. Annuities 
Standard annuities are the classical tool in the management of 
individual longevity risk. They are present in defined benefit 
and notional defined contribution social security systems 
provided by governments, defined benefit plans provided by 
corporations through pension funds, and life annuities 
provided by insurance companies. Life annuities constitute a 
unique financial instrument that accomplishes two of the most 
important objectives of a pension scheme: (i) they protect the 
annuitant from outliving her assets; and (ii) they provide 
retirement income for the remaining life of the annuitant and 
her dependants, offering therefore longevity insurance. 
In the absence of aggregate longevity risk, the pooling 
mechanism implicit in the Law of Large Numbers would be 
sufficient to make longevity risk manageable for annuity 
providers. In the presence of systematic longevity risk, the 
provision of longevity insurance for individuals becomes a 
difficult task since existing instruments do not allow annuity 
providers to effectively hedge aggregate longevity risk. Despite 
their appeal, the annuity market remains small relative to the 
magnitude of risk that individuals are exposed to. Life annuity 
products have been sold in the past primarily as retirement 
accumulation vehicles, rather than pay-out products (Brown et 
al., 2001). Several demand and supply impediments may 
explain this under-annuitization5.  
On the demand side, limitations to the development of annuity 
markets include, first, the level of annuitization from pay-as-
you-go financed pensions, that is, the amount by which 
annuities are crowded out by social security provision and the 
amount buy which they are crowded out by other forms of 
pension saving such as defined benefit occupational schemes. 
Second, annuities are perceived to be unfairly priced, mostly 
because life insurance companies do not fully disclose 
information on the techniques used to calculate the annuity 
premiums. Third, the possibility to bequest assets to 
dependents is not covered by "plain vanilla" annuities. 





                                                                
          
           
 
Fourth, the demand for annuities is determined to some extent 
by personal considerations such as family support, the need to 
cover the costs of unexpected medical expenses, the 
inexistence of sufficient liquid assets to purchase an annuity, or 
other liquidity concerns. For example, for older people, the 
risk of having to pay large medical bills or to cover special 
health care costs induces them to retain at least a fraction of 
their assets instead of annuitizing them. 
Fifth, fiscal incentives are considered insufficient to stimulate 
insurance protection against longevity risk. In modern 
competitive markets, individual financial decisions are also 
driven by people's perceptions about the appeal of alternative 
investments, both during their working lifetime and after 
retirement. For instance, some individuals may avoid 
annuitization on the grounds that they can manage their 
assets better than institutional fund managers. In this scenario, 
introducing tax incentives (or tax-favoured competing assets) 
could undermine the saving decisions in favour of buying 
annuity protection. Finally, in some cases there is a general 
mistrust of the institutions that provide the annuities. 
On the supply side, the type and scope of the limitations to the 
development of annuity markets is also significant. First, high-
quality information on mortality tables depicting a particular 
group's distribution of expected remaining lifetime is required. 
Projected mortality tables should take into consideration the 
stochastic nature of the remaining lifetime and encompass 
cohort effects. Uncertainty regarding mortality tables can 
cause insurance companies to price annuities conservatively, 
exacerbating any adverse selection problems and lowering the 
access to the market. Additionally, uncertainty regarding 
mortality data can cause individuals to seriously underestimate 
their survival prospects, which, in turn, can lead them to 
undervalue the importance of longevity insurance.  
Dissemination of mortality information should, in this sense, be 
considered a matter of public interest and form part of a 
transparent supervision policy6.  
Second, annuity markets are often affected by strong adverse 
selection problems. This arises if buyers of annuities prove to 
live longer than average, inducing insurance companies to 
devise separate mortality tables for annuitants as opposed to 
those for the general population. The existence of adverse 
selection problems induces companies to include significant 
margins in their pricing of annuity contracts. Whether adverse 
selection is quantitatively important may depend on whether 
annuitization is considered optional or mandatory. In this 
sense, increasing compulsory annuitization can significantly 
reduce adverse-selection problems. 
Third, the potential for growth in annuity markets cannot be 
fully realized if insurance companies lack assets with which to 
back the long-term promises represented by annuities. 
6 In Portugal, for instance, there are no regulatory life tables (either 
contemporaneous life tables or prospective life tabla) either for the Portuguese 
overall population or for life-insured populations. As a result, life insurance 
companies are forced to use as their technical basis the life tables compiled for 
other countries. Although this practice is authorized by the Portuguese 
supervisor, the use of survival tables compiled for a different population is 
potentially biased when compared to the demographic conditions observed in 
Portugal, and it involves significant basis risks, in particular the risk of 
overestimating the mortality risk of the population. 
Insurance companies that offer annuity products are faced 
with three major sources of risk: interest-rate risk, inflation risk, 
and longevity risk. Appropriate asset types that address these 
risks either do not exist or are available in insufficient 
quantities. 
Fourth, traditional annuity markets are incomplete, in the 
sense that they do not offer protection against inflation, they 
lack equity market exposure, they are illiquid, and they do not 
insure against multiple shocks. Finally, there are concerns 
regarding regulatory capital requirements, and about the 
market power of existing providers that would make it difficult 
for new entrants to survive. In order to address these 
problems, many policy options exist to encourage and 
promote annuity markets. Examples include mandating 
annuitization, improving financial literacy, dealing with 
longevity risk, and producing longevity indexes. 
 
4.2. Pooled Annuity Funds 
In standard level annuities, annuity providers bear both 
systematic and idiosyncratic mortality risks. Some authors 
have proposed an alternative annuity structure in which pool 
participants are insured against idiosyncratic longevity risk but 
still have to bear systematic longevity risk7  The idea is to 
construct a pooled annuity fund (PAF) considering groups or 
cohorts of retirees and follow a Group Self Annuitization (GSA) 
strategy. Pooled annuity funds have many similarities with 
standard annuities in that the funds released by the 
participants who die prematurely (mortality credits) are 
redistributed among the survivors, in that participants give up 
their bequest or liquidity motives, in that the decision to 
purchase a pooled annuity fund units is irreversible, and in that 
the advantages of investment diversification are exploited. But 
they present a crucial difference: benefit payments are linked 
to the mortality experience of the group and, as such, leave 
annuitants’ incomes and consumption possibilities exposed to 
the uncertainty associated with the mortality risk of the group. 
Insurers and other institutions setting up a pooled annuity fund 
act only as managers of the accounts and, thus, do not bear 
either the investment risk or the mortality or longevity risk. 
This means that pooled annuity funds transfer aggregate 
longevity risk from annuity providers to fund participants, thus 
offering an alternative hedging solution. 
In a pooled annuity fund, the future value of annuity benefits 
remains constant over the whole contract unless deviations 
from expected mortality rates are observed. If that is not the 
case, that is, if the number of those surviving up to higher 
ages is different from expected, the remaining capital has to 
be redistributed among the remaining survivors. In a scenario 
where the number of those surviving is systematically higher 
than initially expected, benefit payments will be reduced to 
prevent fund imbalances. Pooled annuity funds introduce an 
automatic adjustment mechanism to economic and 
demographic risk factors, and they ensure that the fund assets 
are in balance with its liabilities. 




                                                                
 
                                                                
          
           
 
4.3. Longevity Insurance 
An alternative longevity risk hedging solution is a deferred 
inflation-adjusted life annuity contract called advanced-life 
delayed annuity (ALDA).8 This product should be acquired at a 
given early age, it would be paid in instalments over a long 
period and it would have no cash value or survival benefits. In 
this contract, the deferment period can be seen as a 
deductible since the policyholder finances his consumption 
until some advanced age (ranging from 80 to 90, say), after 
which the insurer starts paying the annuity for as long the 
annuitant remains alive.9  
These annuities are often called “longevity insurance” because 
they start paying you a lifetime income stream at a later age to 
prevent you from exhausting the rest of your savings and offer 
a remaining lifetime income. Individuals facing a significant risk 
of running out of money may want to consider purchasing a 
deferred annuity that will kick in at a later age. This way they 
can insure their retirement income against individual longevity 
risk without all the downsides of purchasing an immediate 
annuity when they retire (lack of liquidity and flexibility to use 
accumulated savings in whatever way they choose, lost 
investment earnings, inability to pass it on to their heirs, and 
so on).  
 
4.4. Pension Buy-outs and 
Pension Buy-ins 
Pension buy-outs and pension buy-ins are a type of transaction 
that has long been used to transfer liabilities and associated 
assets for a specified set of pension plan participants to an 
insurance company under a group annuity contract. The 
operations can be designed to reduce the size of the pension 
plan on the sponsor's balance sheet or to relieve the sponsor 
permanently of the investment and longevity risks associated 
with the pension benefits. 
In a pension buy-out, existing pension plan assets or an 
insured annuity block are transferred to an insurance 
company. All asset and longevity risk is transferred, including 
the administration of the plan. Insurers usually issue a group 
annuity contract as part of a buy-out in return for a single 
premium payment. The transaction provides the insurer with 
complete ability to control and manage the underlying assets, 
but also leaves him exposed to all the asset management 
related risks (investment risk, credit risk, inflation risk, longevity 
risk, and liquidity risk). 
A pension buy-in transaction allows for more flexibility in that 
the underlying assets remain with the pension plan manager, 
who pays a single premium to an insurance company in 
8
 See, e.g., Milevsky (2005). 
9
 Recently, the US Treasury Department announced that new tax rules will allow 
people to use up to 25% of their 401(k) and IRA (Individual Retirement Account) 
balances (to a maximum of $125k) to purchase a deferred income annuity as 
long as they begin collecting income by age 85. 
exchange for a group annuity that makes periodic payments 
that match those of its pension obligations. The annuity is 
recorded as an asset on the pension plan’s books. All asset 
and longevity risk is transferred but the administration of the 
plan is not. A buy-in provides for partial risk transfer, with the 
buyer retaining liability for ultimate payment to annuitants. The 
buy-in may be revocable and provide for a conversion into a 
buy-out at some later point in time. 
Pension buy-outs and buy-ins allow the plans to dispose of 
longevity, inflation, and asset investment risks. In exchange, 
plan members become exposed to counterparty risk from the 
insurer (annuity provider). Full buyouts are usually followed by 
the shutdown of the pension scheme. Pension buy-outs can 
be an attractive solution for smaller plans that want to 
eliminate their longevity risk exposure. 
Annuities resulting from buy-out or buy-in transactions can be 
very expensive due to regulatory requirements on the 
insurance companies’ side. Additionally, the capacity in the 
bulk annuity market is limited as life insurers have a limited 
appetite for additional longevity risk. Their willingness to 
accept further longevity risk is also restricted by the fact that 
diversifying the mortality risk is limited. Moreover, regulatory 
and legal restrictions in many countries and large mismatches 
between mortality and longevity exposure may hinder the 
development of these transactions. 
 
4.5. Longevity risk hedging 
contracts 
Longevity risk hedging contracts, whether structured as 
longevity insurance or as a longevity swap, provide pension 
plans with a longevity risk mitigation strategy. By entering into 
a longevity risk hedging contract, pension plans seek to hedge 
longevity risk while retaining interest rate and investment risk. 
Longevity risk hedging contracts are designed to reduce the 
risk to pension plans of increased costs associated with 
unexpected unfavourable longevity experience, namely plan 
members living systematically longer than reflected in their 
mortality assumptions.  
There are two roughly types of longevity risk hedging 
contracts: indemnity-based and index-based contracts. With 
both types of contracts, the pension plan (hedge buyer) agrees 
to provide a counterparty (hedge provider) with regular pre-
determined, or “fixed”, payments based on agreed upon 
mortality assumptions. In return, the counterparty provides the 
pension plan with regular floating payments based on either 
the pension plan’s actual mortality experience (indemnity-based 
longevity contract) or an agreed upon mortality or longevity 
index (index-based longevity contract). For the pension plan, 
the goal is to have more predictable outflows over the period 
covered by the longevity risk hedging contract. The 
counterparty to the contract assumes the longevity risk over 
the period covered by the contract. However, the ultimate 
responsibility for paying pension benefits to the plan 




                                                                
          
           
 
In the case of indemnity-based longevity contracts, if the 
pension plan’s beneficiaries live longer than was assumed on 
the plan’s actuarial valuations, higher payments from the 
counterparty to the pension plan serve to offset the plan’s 
higher pension costs. In this scenario, the indemnity-based 
contract will generally be “in the money”, or have a positive 
value, for the pension plan. If, on the other hand, beneficiaries 
live shorter than expected, lower payments from the 
counterparty to the pension plan mean that the overall cost to 
the pension plan of paying beneficiaries’ pensions will 
effectively be held constant. In this way, indemnity-based 
contracts protect pension plans both from increases and 
decreases in costs arising from unanticipated changes in the 
longevity of the plan’s beneficiaries. 
In the case of index-based contracts, the actual mortality 
experience of the pension plan does not affect the amount of 
the payments from the hedge provider to the pension plan 
directly. However, if there is an increase in longevity as 
measured by the index used to set the counterparty’s 
payments to the pension plan, the payments from the 
counterparty to the plan will be higher. Pension plans that 
pursue an index-based contract are exposed to basis risk. Basis 
risk refers here to the risk emerging from the possibility that 
the mortality experience of the pension plan can differ from 
that of the index on which the contract is based. This means 
that the plan’s longevity risk will be mitigated by the contract 
only to the extent that the changes in the mortality of the 
beneficiaries of the pension track the changes in the index. On 
the contrary, indemnity-based longevity risk hedging contracts 
introduce no basis risk as they indemnify the pension plan for 
their actual experience (i.e. the floating payments are based on 
the actual mortality experience of the plan). 
Unlike a pension buy-out or buy-in, a longevity hedge only 
allows the pension plan to transfer longevity risk, while other 
sources of risk remain on its books and must be managed 
separately. There are no transfer of assets, allowing the plan 
sponsor to retain investment control and exposure to asset 
returns. In a longevity hedge risks are hedged with a 
counterparty, normally an investment bank, an insurer or a 
reinsurer. 
Contrary to both pension buy-out and buy-in, which require a 
significant up-front premium and the immediate recognition of 
a loss if the premium is higher than the current asset reserve, 
longevity risk hedging contracts allow plan providers to 
manage the longevity risk more efficiently, without having to 
pay an up-front premium and with no immediate impact on 
their balance sheets.10  
But longevity risk hedging contracts present some risks for a 
pension plan or annuity provider. First, hedge buyers become 
exposed to counterparty risk, i.e., to the risk that the 
counterparty to the longevity risk hedging contract will not live 
up to its contractual obligations. Although payment flows 
between the counterparties are generally netted, the hedge 
10 For a detailed list of longevity swaps, longevity risk transfer and longevity 
reinsurance transactions that have taken place in the reinsurance and capital 
markets see, for instance, 
http://www.artemis.bm/library/longevity_swaps_risk_transfers.html. 
buyer may demand collateral to further mitigate this type of 
risk or require a credit rating for the counterparty.  
Second, hedge buyers are exposed to rollover risk if the 
longevity risk hedging contracts are negotiated for a shorter 
time period than the liabilities that they cover. The rollover risk 
comes from the fact that entering into a new contract will be 
more expensive if longevity ultimately increases faster than 
expected. Rollover risk will be more significant for index-based 
risk hedging contracts since indemnity-based contracts carry 
little or no rollover risk as they are typically structured for the 
remaining life of the covered populations, or at least for a 
period that is long enough to cover the maturity of the living 
benefits of the majority of the covered population. Third, 
hedge buyers are exposed to basis risk as explained above. 
Finally, contracts are subject to legal risk since they are not 
traded on an exchange. 
The issue of basis risk is critical for the development of a 
longevity market. Full population mortality indices carry basis 
risk to liabilities of individual pension funds and insurers. Basis 
risk originates from age, gender, regional, and socio-economic 
sources. An important challenge for the market is the need to 
develop transparency and liquidity by standardization while 
maintaining the hedging purposes of the capital market 
instruments. In recent years, a number of initiatives have been 
undertaken to foster transparency in the market around 
longevity risk and to contribute to the development of 
longevity risk transfer mechanisms, namely the creation of 
longevity risk indexes. Thos most significant examples include 
the Credit Suisse Longevity Index, launched in December 
2005, the JP Morgan Index with LifeMetrics, launched in 
March 2007, the Goldman Sachs Mortality Index, launched in 
December 2007 and the Xpect Data, launched in March 2008 
by Deutsche Borse. 
 
4.6. Longevity and Mortality 
Bonds 
An alternative capital market solution for longevity risk hedging 
involves securitization, namely the issuance of longevity or 
mortality bonds. These bonds are essentially financial debt 
instruments with a stochastic maturity in which future principal 
or coupon cash flows depend on the realization of a 
survivorship or mortality index of a selected birth cohort or 
population (Blake et al, 2006).  The survivorship index 
represents, typically, the proportion of some initial reference 
population aged   at time   who are still alive at some future 
time. The mortality index represents, typically, the mortality 
level for year   compared to that on the base year. 
Longevity bonds were first proposed by Blake and Burrows 
(2001), and the first operational mortality-linked bond -the Swiss 
Re mortality catastrophe bond- was successfully issued in 2003. 
A second mortality-linked bond -the EIB/BNP Paribas longevity 
bond- was announced in 2004 but ultimately failed to come to 
market, and various other mortality-linked products have been 
issued afterwards. The underlying idea beyond the use of 




                                                                
          
           
 
providers and pension funds- is very simple: if the reference 
population lives longer than expected, coupon payments will be 
larger than predicted and they will generate additional cash 
flows for annuity providers who face longevity risk in their 
annuity portfolios. The bond should be, in principle, a very long-
term bond designed to protect the holder against any 
unanticipated improvement in mortality up to the maturity of a 
sizable fraction of the annuity portfolio cash flows. 
Longevity bonds provide a perfect hedge only for providers 
with plan members or annuitants who have exactly the same 
mortality experience over time as the cohort underlying the 
bond. If the plan members or annuitants have a mortality 
experience that differs from that of the national population, it 
will once again introduce basis risk.  
Mortality-linked bonds correspond to a general class of bonds 
whose cash flows are linked to realised mortality. They differ 
from longevity bonds in that their cash flows are linked to a 
mortality index, whereas in the case of longevity bonds cash 
flows are linked to a survivor index. The first bond with cash 
flows linked to the realisation of a composite mortality index 
was the Swiss Re bond issued in December 2003. This bond 
had a maturity of three years, a principal of $400m, and it 
offered investors a floating coupon of LIBOR+135 basis points.  
In return for this coupon rate, the principal was unprotected, 
and was dependent on the realized value of a weighted index 
of mortality rates in five countries: the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Switzerland. 
The principal was repayable in full only if the mortality index 
did not exceed 1.3 times the 2002 base level during any year 
of the bond’s life, and it was otherwise dependent on the 
realized values of the mortality index. This short-term mortality 
catastrophe bond was designed to hedge the issuer against an 
extreme increase in mortality, i.e., the risk of policyholders 
living on average shorter than expected and so, from the 
insurer’s perspective, the risk that benefits on life policies will 
have to be paid before expected. 
There are many possible types of longevity bonds that could 
be developed. Two broad categories include “principal-at-risk” 
longevity bonds, that is, bonds in which the investor risks 
losing all or part of the principal if the underlying mortality 
event is actually observed, and “coupon-based” longevity 
bonds in which the coupon payment is linked to mortality. 
Other potential categories include Zero Coupon Longevity 
Bonds, Geared Longevity Bonds and Longevity Spreads, 
Inverse Longevity Bonds, Deferred Longevity Bonds, Survivor 
Bonds amd Collateralized Longevity Bonds.11  
The market for mortality-linked bonds has been increasing 
steadily since their first issue in 2003. This notwithstanding, if 
longevity bonds are to provide effective hedging instruments 
for the longevity risks actually borne by pension plans and 
annuity providers, various problems associated with creating a 
new liquid market in mortality-linked securities need to be 
resolved. First, there is a potential weak point in the longevity 
bond market on the supply side, because there are potentially 
few natural issuers.  Because of this problem, some advocate 
11 For a detailed analysis of the categories of longevity bonds and other 
longevity-linked securities see, for instance, Blake et al. (2006). 
the issuance of longevity bonds by governments. There are a 
number of arguments pro and against the government 
issuance of longevity bonds. Authors like Blake and Burrows 
(2001), Blake (2003), and Brown and Orzag (2006) favour the 
government issuance of longevity bonds invoking some of the 
classic arguments for government intervention (public goods, 
externalities, market failures, adverse selection, 
intergenerational issues, etc.).  
Specifically, the authors argue that government issuance will 
suppress a market failure created by market incompleteness 
(governments acting as lenders of last resort), and that by 
spreading the risk over a very large number of taxpayers the 
market price of longevity risk will be eliminated.  They also 
argue that governments contribute to the increase in longevity 
and that government issuance of longevity bonds will allow for 
a more efficient intergenerational risk sharing. Regarding the 
intergenerational issues, if financial markets share with 
governments the capacity to allocate risk across risk bearers 
and across time, governments have the unique power to 
allocate risk across both current (born) and future (unborn) 
generations. A relevant argument against government 
issuance of longevity bonds is that governments already have 
a large exposure to longevity risk through defined benefit 
pension systems and public health care systems, and that by 
issuing longevity bonds governments would be diversifying 
only within their group of taxpayers (Dowd, 2003). 
Second, the choice of survivor index is critical to the success 
of longevity bonds since the bond’s cash flows must provide a 
reasonably close match to the payments the hedger needs to 
make if the bond is to provide an effective hedge. Survivor 
indices suffer from some problems since (i) they are 
constructed from mortality data that is published infrequently 
and subject to measurement and statistical errors, (ii) the 
historical mortality data backing the index typically needs to be 
smoothed and it is subject to integrity and contamination risk, 
and (iii) the index design involves projections of future 
mortality scenarios that are subject to both model and 
parameter risk. 
Third, longevity-linked securities entail significant valuation 
problems since they cannot be valued using the standard spot 
yield curve and zero-arbitrage (or net present value) methods 
because of market incompleteness. Alternative methods to 
estimate the market price of longevity risk have been 
suggested and include distortion approaches to pricing, the 
use of classic premium principles (for example, the standard 
deviation principle) or traditional performance measures (for 
example, the Sharpe ratio), adopting a risk-neutral approach, 
using mean-variance and risk minimization strategies or a 
derivation of the consumption capital-asset pricing model. 
Fourth, standardization, liquidity, and transparency have 
proven to be crucial to develop the market for every financial 
product and they need to be addressed in the case of 
longevity bonds as well. Fifth, longevity risk hedges via capital 
market instruments must result in an appropriate risk capital 
relief for pension funds so as to increase the attractiveness of 
longevity hedges. Finally, credit risk issues must be addressed 





                                                                
          
           
 
4.7. Q-Forwards 
Introduced by the investment bank JPMorgan, a q-forward is 
an agreement between two parties to exchange at a future 
date (the maturity of the contract) an amount proportional to 
the realized mortality rate of a given population or 
subpopulation, in return for an amount proportional to a fixed 
mortality rate that has been mutually agreed at inception. In 
other words, a q-forward is a zero coupon swap that 
exchanges fixed mortality for realized mortality at maturity 
(Coughlan et al., 2007). In this contract, the q-forward seller, 
that is, the hedge buyer, say a pension fund, will be paid by 
the counterpart of the forward if longevity increases by more 
than expected.  
Contrary to longevity bonds and swaps that are linked to a 
survival rate that depends on a series of mortality rates, q-
forwards are based on a single mortality rate. The floating leg 
of q-forwards is linked to a broad-based index (the LifeMetrics 
index), which is derived from national population statistics. 
Relevant data are available in the public domain for investors' 
reference. The fixed rate payers (that is, those who receive a 
floating mortality rate) require compensation to take on the 
longevity risk. The forward rate will lie below the 
corresponding expected mortality rate so that on average (that 
is, if mortality is realized as expected), a net payment will be 
made from the fixed rate receivers to the fixed rate payers. 
The spread can be regarded as the risk premium for assuming 
the longevity risk. 
In principle, q-forwards could be the basic building block for 
the development of many other more complex longevity-linked 
derivatives, for instance index-longevity swaps. By setting up a 
portfolio of q-forwards, providers (life insurance companies, 
pension plans, or annuity providers) could in principle engineer 
an effective hedge of the mortality or longevity risks. 
4.8. Reinsurance 
arrangements 
Insurers and banks can diversify away specific longevity risk by 
pooling annuitants and managing the foreseeable part of 
aggregate longevity risk and by charging appropriate 
premium. Risk transfer can be realized via traditional 
reinsurance arrangements or via swap-like reinsurance. In the 
later case, the interest of this reinsurance arrangement is 
mainly due to the possibility that it creates for the reinsurer to 
hedge the risk taken from the issuer via a transfer to the 
capital market, namely via longevity bonds. 
Traditional reinsurance arrangements (e.g. surplus 
reinsurance, XL reinsurance, Stop-Loss, etc.) can also be, at 
least in principle, applied to annuity portfolios (see, e.g., 
Olivieri, 2005). Risk transfer via traditional reinsurance mainly 
relies on the improved diversification of risks when these are 
taken on by the reinsurer, thanks to an enforcement of 
pooling effects. However, such enforcement of pooling effects 
can be achieved only in relation to random fluctuations in 
mortality, whilst systematic longevity risk cannot be diversified 
inside the insurance and reinsurance process. Hence, to be 
more effective, the reinsurance transfer must be 
complemented with a further transfer to capital markets, 






          
           
 
5 Final Remarks 
Longevity risk, which is the uncertainty in future mortality 
developments, affects pension providers, life insurers, and 
governments. The population structure of developed countries 
is increasingly leaning towards the old, and the effects of 
medical advances and lifestyle choices on mortality are to 
some extent unpredictable. Until recently, the importance of 
longevity risk was not fully recognized. For individuals, the 
ability to hedge against longevity risk depends on the 
existence of an appropriate insurance market, namely a well-
developed market for lifetime annuities. For providers, the 
ability to make good on their pension or benefit promises 
depends, to a considerable extent, on how well they manage 
this risk. 
The possibilities for risk mitigation differ between institutions. 
Public pay-as-you-go pension schemes are typically able to 
reduce their benefits and to increase their contributions. In 
these schemes, longevity risk is transferred to the scheme 
members as they receive less or pay more to compensate for 
unanticipated increases in longevity. This scenario has indeed 
occurred in many OECD countries during recent decades.  
In contrast, pension funds and annuity providers do not 
usually have such opportunities. Their obligations are usually 
fixed which makes them much more vulnerable to increases in 
longevity. Therefore, adequate and efficient longevity risk 
mitigation for these institutions is highly relevant from both a 
microeconomic and a macroeconomic perspective. 
Part of the answer to aggregate, non-diversifiable, longevity 
risk is to ensure that annuity providers, insurance companies 
and pension plans have access to suitable hedge instruments. 
These instruments include traditional insurance-based 
solutions, namely pension buy-ins and buy-outs, reinsurance 
arrangements, annuities and longevity insurance, and also 
more recent capital market solutions.  
Various longevity-linked instruments have been proposed to 
manage longevity risk.  These instruments include longevity 
bonds, mortality bonds, longevity swaps and q-forwards. We 
have discussed how such instruments, once in existence, can 
be used to hedge longevity and mortality risk exposures in 
pensions or life insurance liabilities.  Recent data suggests that 
the demand for longevity-linked instruments is a reality, and 
that the number and significance of longevity transactions is 
increasing.  
The traditional insurance-based options and the new capital 
market solutions to hedge of longevity risk are not a substitute 
for good risk management, but they will be very useful for 
well-managed institutions who want to confront the problems 
of managing their longevity risk exposures seriously. Once the 
difficulties associated with creating a new liquid market in 
mortality-linked securities are resolved, markets in these 
securities will develop and mature, and they will provide the 
insurers with useful tools specifically designed to manage 
longevity risk. We are probably seeing the rise of a completely 
new class of assets that will enrich the global financial market 
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